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The Other Deficit
By Craig S. Hakkio
C
onsiderable attention has been focused re-
cently on the size and persistence of the U.S.
budget deficit. Somewhat lost in the head-
lines is growing concern among many economists
and policymakers over “the other deficit”—the
U.S. current account deficit. Before 1982, U.S.
current account deficits were small and temporary,
as imports of goods and services rarely exceeded
exports for an extended period. Since 1982, how-
ever, this deficit has increased significantly and
many analysts expect the deficit to remain high well
into the next century.
Large current account deficits pose both a short-
term risk and a long-term problem for the United
States. At present, the United States depends on a
commensurately large flow of foreign capital into
U.S. markets to finance the current account deficit.
If market sentiment were to shift against the United
States, higher interest rates and a lower exchange
value of the dollar might be necessary to continue
to attract foreign capital. A few years ago, this
short-run risk was minimal. Today, with increas-
ingly volatile short-term capital flows, such fears
cannot be dismissed so easily.
Current account deficits also pose a long-term
problem for the U.S. economy. Because financing
a chronic deficit requires the United States to bor-
row from abroad, future interest payments on this
debt could lower the standard of living in the United
States. Unfortunately, like the budget deficit, there
is not an easy solution to the current account deficit.
In fact, the two deficits are interrelated and reducing
the current account deficit requires significant ac-
tions to reduce the budget deficit and to stimulate
private saving in the United States.
This article examines the current account deficit
and its implications. The first section discusses why
the current account deficit became large and persist-
ent in the early 1980s. The second section analyzes
the short-term risk that current account deficits pose
for the U.S. economy. The third section analyzes the
long-term problem associated with a chronic cur-
rent account deficit. 
THE U.S. CURRENT ACCOUNT
DEFICIT
Before 1982, U.S. current account deficits were
small and temporary. Deficits in some years were
typically offset by surpluses in other years. Since
1982, though, the United States has experienced
large and chronic current account deficits. Insight
into their causes can be gained by studying the net
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the article.inflows of foreign capital used to finance the current
account. Analysis of these capital flows suggests
that low private saving and large government
budget deficits in the United States are the key
factors behind the large current account deficit.
The U.S. current account deficit: large and
persistent
The current account is the broadest measure of a
country’s trade with the rest of the world. The
current account has four major components. The
most familiar component is the merchandise bal-
ance of trade. A balance of trade deficit occurs when
more goods are imported from abroad than are
exported. A second component is the service ac-
count balance, which includes the net sale of insur-
ance, real estate, shipping, and similar tradable
services. A third component is the investment in-
come balance, which equals interest payments to
foreign investors minus interest receipts of domes-
tic residents on foreign investments. The last com-
ponent is unilateral transfers, which equal the value
of gifts, foreign aid, and nonmilitary economic
development grants. The sum of these four balances
equals the current account balance.
The current account deficit changed in two ways
starting in 1982. First, the size of the deficit in-
creased significantly. Chart 1 shows the current
account deficit from 1960 to 1994. In the top panel,
the dotted line shows that the current account sur-
plus averaged $1.7 billion per year from 1960 to
1981. This small current account surplus turned into
a large current account deficit beginning in 1981,
averaging $96.7 billion per year from 1982 to 1994.
Since the U.S. economy was 13 times larger in 1994
than in 1960, the current account might have grown
simply because the U.S. economy grew. But even
after controlling for the size of the economy, the
current account deficit increased significantly. The
bottom panel of the chart shows the current account
as a share of GDP. As in the top panel, the dotted
line shows that from 1960 to 1981 the average
current account surplus was 0.3 percent of GDP;
from 1982 to 1994, the average current account
deficit grew to 2.0 percent of GDP. 
The increase in the current account deficit was
split among the four components of the deficit.
Chart 2 shows the average size of each component
during the 1960-81 and 1982-94 periods. As indi-
cated, the increase in the current account deficit was
mainly due to the deterioration in the merchandise
trade balance. This is not too surprising since mer-
chandise trade is about two-thirds of total trade.
1
The second change was that the current account
deficit became persistent after 1982. From 1960
to 1981, the current account was sometimes in
deficit and sometimes in surplus. After 1982, how-
ever, the current account has been consistently in
deficit. Moreover, analysts expect the deficit to
continue for years to come. The International
Monetary Fund projects a U.S. current account
deficit of 2.4 percent of GDP from 1995 to 1999,
and the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development projects a deficit of 2 percent
over the same period (IMF, p. 43, and OECD, p.
28). Data Resources, Incorporated, projects the
current account deficit to average 1.8 percent from
1995 to 2019 (DRI, pp. A.48-49).
Net capital inflow: financing the U.S.
current account deficit
Insight into the causes of the deficit can be gained
by looking at how the deficit is financed. In balance
of payments terminology, net capital inflow is the
financial counterpart of the current account deficit.
Definitionally, the current account records all trans-
actions involving goods or services flowing into or
out of the United States, while the net capital ac-
count records all transactions involving capital
flowing into or out of the United States. 
For example, when a U.S. company borrows from
abroad, foreign capital flows into the United States.
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Chart 1
Note: The dotted line equals the average current account surplus from 1960 to 1981, and the average current account deficit from
1982 to 1994.
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce.
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 13More generally, borrowing from abroad and selling
a domestic asset to a foreigner are considered capi-
tal inflows, while lending abroad and buying a
foreign asset are considered capital outflows. A net
capital inflow, therefore, occurs when capital flow-
ing into a country exceeds capital flowing out; or
alternatively, a net capital inflow occurs when bor-
rowing from abroad exceeds lending abroad. 
Net capital inflow is often broken down into
private net capital inflow and official net capital
inflow. Private capital flows are undertaken by pri-
vate investors and include direct investment, pur-
chases of stocks and bonds, and bank flows. Official
capital flows are undertaken by official government
agencies, primarily foreign monetary authorities,
who choose to increase their holdings of interna-
tional reserves, particularly dollars.
2
As a matter of bookkeeping, all of a country’s
international transactions, those involving goods
and services as well as those involving capital in-
flows and outflows, must sum to zero. Therefore, a
current account deficit must by definition be equal
to net capital inflow. Intuitively, when a nation
imports more goods and services than it exports—
and thus runs a current account deficit—it must
finance the deficit  by borrowing from abroad. This
is similar to what happens when a family spends
more on goods and services than it takes in as
income, so it finances the excess spending by bor-
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14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYthat some residents of a country borrow from
abroad while other residents lend abroad. It is the
excess of borrowing over lending, which equals the
net capital inflow, that pays for the current account
deficit. For this reason, the current account deficit
is said to be financed by a net capital inflow. 
While bookkeeping ensures that net capital in-
flow equals the current account deficit, it does not
say how this outcome is achieved in a market
economy. In a market economy, investors decide
how much to borrow and lend, and firms and con-
sumers decide how much to import and export. The
decision by U.S. and foreign investors to borrow
from abroad and lend abroad has little or nothing to
do with a desire to finance the current account
deficit. Nevertheless, all these decisions collec-
tively must result in a net capital inflow that equals
the current account deficit.
The decisions of investors and consumers are
influenced by a number of economic forces.
Changes in interest rates, exchange rates, prices,
and income work together to ensure that the net
capital inflow and the current account deficit are
equal. In 1994, for example, both the U.S. current
account deficit and net capital inflow were $156
billion.
3 In the marketplace, this balance was
brought about by changes in interest rates and ex-
change rates. At the prevailing rates, investors were
willing to borrow and lend capital, or buy and sell
assets, resulting in a net capital inflow of $156
billion. At the same time, incomes and prices adjusted
so that consumers and firms were willing to import
and export enough to bring about a current account
deficit that exactly equaled the net capital inflow.
Causes of the U.S. current account deficit
What caused the current account deficit to move
from near balance to a large deficit in 1982, forcing
the United States to depend on large foreign capital
inflows? One way to answer this question is to
examine the linkages between domestic savings
and investment and foreign capital inflows. A
simple accounting identity relates private savings,
domestic investment, the budget deficit, and the
current account deficit. Investment spending and
the budget deficit are the two domestic uses of
funds. Domestic savings and net capital inflow are
the two sources of funds. Since the sources of funds
must equal the uses of funds, the funds used to
finance domestic investment and the budget deficit
must come from domestic savings and net capital
inflow from abroad. This relationship is shown in
equation (1):
   Uses = Sources (1)
   I + BD =  S + NKIN,
where I = domestic private investment, BD = budget
deficit, S = domestic private savings, and NKIN =
net capital inflow. 
If the domestic uses of funds exceed the domestic
sources of funds, the excess must be borrowed from
abroad—resulting in a net capital inflow. This rela-
tionship can be seen in equation (2):
   NKIN =  I + BD - S. (2)
Furthermore, since the current account deficit
(CAD) equals net capital inflow, equation (2) can
be rewritten as:
    CAD =  I + BD - S. (3)
Equations (2) and (3) show that a country with
good investment prospects, a large budget deficit,
or a low propensity to save tends to have a net
capital inflow and a current account deficit. In other
words, policies that promote investment spending,
discourage private saving, or lead to a large budget
deficit result in a current account deficit.
The rise in the U.S. current account deficit since
1982 has been associated with a decline in private
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 15savings, an increase in the budget deficit, and not a
rise in domestic investment (Table 1).
4 Since eco-
nomic growth depends on net additions to the capital
stock, it makes sense to look at net investment rather
than gross investment. Consequently, all measures
of investment, savings, and income are net rather
than gross.
5 Furthermore, since the economy has
grown so much over the period, all figures are
reported relative to net domestic product (NDP).
Comparing the 1960-81 period with the 1982-94
period shows that net private savings fell from 8.9
percent of NDP to 6.5 percent, while the budget
deficit rose from 0.6 percent of NDP to 3.0 percent.
Rather than rising, net investment actually fell from
7.9 percent of NDP to 5.0 percent.
6 Therefore, the
causes of the current account deficit appear to lie
with the increase in the government budget deficit
and the decrease in the private saving rates since
1982 rather than with an increase in investment
prospects in the United States.
THE SHORT-TERM RISK OF THE
CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT
Because the United States is dependent on a
steady flow of foreign capital to finance its current
account deficit, a shift in market sentiment by pri-
vate investors poses a risk to the U.S. economy. If
private investors become reluctant to acquire dollar
securities, foreign monetary authorities could take
up the slack and increase their holdings of dollar
reserves. However, given the large holdings of dol-
lar reserves by foreign monetary authorities, they
may be reluctant to do so. Therefore, to attract
domestic and foreign investors back to U.S. securi-
ties, U.S. interest rates would need to rise and the
exchange rate would need to fall. Moreover, be-
cause global financial markets are large and liquid,
the possibility of higher interest rates and a lower
exchange rate is greater than if financial markets
were smaller and less liquid.
The role of private investors
From 1982 to 1994, much of the current account
deficit was financed by private investors. Chart 3
shows net private capital inflow and net official
capital  inflow during this period. Except for 1991-
93, net private capital inflows were always larger
than net official capital inflows. Moreover, during
the 1982-94 period, net private inflows averaged
$89 billion per year compared to the average current
account deficit of $103 billion per year, indicating
net private inflows financed 87 percent of the cur-
rent account deficit.
7 While it is not possible to
determine exactly who is providing the capital,
Table 1
U.S. BUDGET DEFICIT, SAVINGS, INVESTMENT, AND NET CAPITAL INFLOW
(percent of net domestic product)
1960-81 1982-94
Net capital inflow -.5 2.0
Net domestic investment 7.9 5.0
Net private savings 8.9 6.5
Budget deficit .6 3.0
16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYsome information is available. In 1993, 74 percent
of private inflows came from Western Europe and
6 percent from Canada. Additional information is
available on the stock of assets held by citizens of
various countries. For example, 57 percent of all
U.S. securities other than Treasury securities was
held by Western Europeans, 13 percent by the Japa-
nese, and 10 percent by Canadians. Looking at
foreign direct investment, 61 percent is held by
Western Europeans, 22 percent by the Japanese, and
9 percent by Canadians.
There is also a potential risk that private investors,
at some point, might become reluctant to continue
financing the U.S. current account deficit. There are
a number of reasons why private investors might
switch from U.S. securities to foreign securities.
One reason is that investment opportunities in other
countries relative to the United States may improve.
For example, if U.S. economic growth slows and
U.S. interest rates decline, investors might search
for higher yields in other markets. Similarly, if
European economic growth increases, higher for-
eign interest rates could cause investors to switch
from U.S. securities to European securities.
A second reason investors might withdraw from
U.S. markets is that investor confidence in eco-
nomic policy in the United States could decline
relative to other countries. For example, expectations
of a rising and prolonged budget deficit might cause
investors to become concerned about U.S. economic
policy. Or, increased confidence in the Bundesbank
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 17to purchase German bonds rather than U.S. bonds. A
banking crisis in the United States could also cause
investors to search for safer markets in other coun-
tries. Clearly, any single event has a low probability
of causing a shift in confidence. But, even a low
probability of a shift in confidence is of concern to
policymakers. Moreover, a confluence of such
events could have a significant effect on investor
confidence.
There is also a potential risk that investors might
switch from U.S. to foreign securities if they be-
come concerned about the United States running a
large and persistent current account deficit. As the
United States finances its persistent deficit by bor-
rowing from abroad, U.S. international indebtedness
increases commensurately. The IMF forecasts that
U.S. net international debt may continue rising to
nearly 20 percent of GDP by the end of the century.
8
DRI predicts U.S. net international debt relative to
GDP will continue to rise from its current level of
9 percent to GDP until early the next century, when
it will level off in 2004 at nearly 25 percent of GDP.
At some point, private foreign investors may
decide U.S. international debt is too high to con-
tinue financing the current account deficit at pre-
vailing interest rates and exchange rates. Just as
banks are reluctant to loan money to individuals
with excessive debt, foreign investors may become
reluctant to lend money to the United States. If
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18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYinflows would need to be found or interest rates and
exchange rates would need to adjust. 
Unfortunately, neither economic theory nor the
experience of other countries suggests whether 9
percent, or even 25 percent, is too high a level of net
international debt. In 1992, there was a wide range
of net international debt levels relative to GDP in
the G7 countries (Chart 4).
9 Canadian net interna-
tional debt was the highest at about 40 percent of
GDP. France and Italy had net international debt
levels near that of the United States, while Germany
and Japan had net international assets of about 10
percent.
10
The role of official financing
If private market sentiment were to shift against
U.S. securities, and private investors were to start
selling U.S. securities, another source of foreign
funds would need to be found. One possible source
would be foreign monetary authorities. It is possible
that foreign monetary authorities—that is, foreign
central banks—would take up the slack by purchas-
ing dollars. In general, official financing takes up
the slack only when the inflow of private capital is
insufficient to cover the deficit. That was the case
for the United States from 1992 to 1994.
In the decade prior to 1992, net private capital
inflows were the primary source of financing for the
current account deficit. From 1982 to 1991, private
capital inflows averaged $97 billion per year and
official inflows averaged only $14 billion. From
1992 to 1994, however, private inflows averaged
$34 billion and official inflows averaged $45 billion.
The current account deficit averaged $101 billion
during the first period and $104 billion during the
second period. As a result, private inflows financed
96 percent of the current account deficit during the
1982-91 period, while official inflows financed
only 14 percent.
11 During the 1992-94 period, in
contrast, the share of the current account financed
by private inflows fell to 33 percent, while the share
financed by official inflows rose to 43 percent.
Given the relatively large share of the current
account deficit already being financed by official
net capital inflow, there is a potential risk that an
adverse shift in private market sentiment would not
be offset by a further increase in official capital
inflows. From 1992 to 1994, as foreign private inves-
tors became unwilling to finance the current ac-
count deficit at prevailing interest rates and
exchange rates, foreign monetary authorities did
step in to take up the slack. In the future, though, if
foreign investors become less willing to finance the
current account deficit, foreign monetary authorities
may decide that fundamental changes in U.S. policy
would be needed to restore the confidence of private
investors. If so, foreign monetary authorities may
resist the pressure to accumulate more dollar re-
serves until U.S. policy is changed. Thus, a reduction
in the private net capital inflow may not be offset
by an increase in the official net capital inflow.
Not only may official net capital inflow not rise
to offset an adverse shift in market sentiment, but
official inflows could fall if countries decide to
accumulate fewer dollar reserves. The rise in offi-
cial inflows during 1992-94 reflected, in part, the
action of some Latin American countries to increase
their dollar reserves.
12 These capital inflows re-
sulted from improvements in Latin American
growth and investment prospects, continued priva-
tization sales of Latin American government-
owned enterprises, and large private inflows into
some Latin American countries. Moreover, several
fast-growing, newly industrialized countries in Asia
also accumulated dollar assets.
13 Since some of the
reasons for the buildup in reserves no longer apply,
these countries may no longer accumulate dollar
reserves. Furthermore, following the Mexican ex-
change rate crisis, some Latin American countries
may no longer increase their holdings of dollar
reserves, leading to a decline in the U.S. foreign
official inflow. Finally, from 1992 to 1994, many
industrial countries acquired U.S. official assets as
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 19part of their foreign exchange market intervention
operations. Because foreign exchange market inter-
vention is not likely to be a long-term source of
capital inflow, official net capital inflow could ac-
tually decline.
In short, a shift in market sentiment away from
dollar securities to foreign securities may not nec-
essarily be offset by a rise in official net capital
inflow. Therefore, foreign private investors would
need to be attracted back to U.S. financial markets.
Doing so, however, would require higher interest
rates and a lower exchange rate to make U.S. secu-
rities more attractive. That is, higher interest rates
and a lower exchange rate would be the price the
United States might need to pay to offset an adverse
shift in market sentiment.
The risk of short-term financing  
The risk posed by an adverse shift in private
market sentiment may be exacerbated because
global financial markets are highly liquid and well-
developed. In such an environment, both foreign
and domestic investors can quickly sell U.S. secu-
rities, thereby leading to even higher interest rates
and a lower exchange rate.
Today’s financial markets are highly efficient. For
example, transactions costs have declined dramati-
cally in recent years, making it inexpensive for
investors to sell U.S. securities and buy foreign
securities (Mussa and Goldstein, pp. 250-51).
14 In
addition, the markets for government securities,
equity, corporate debt, commercial paper, bank
CDs, asset-backed securities, and derivative instru-
ments are all highly liquid (Mussa and Goldstein,
p. 250). Finally, investors have a wide range of
securities available to them.
Such efficiency in financial markets compounds the
risk of running a current account deficit. Because
the markets are so efficient, both foreign and do-
mestic investors could easily speculate against U.S.
securities in the event of an adverse shift in market
sentiment. Moreover, investors can sell U.S. secu-
rities and buy foreign securities—quickly, easily, and
at little cost. As a result, large changes in interest
rates and the exchange rates can occur quickly.
Thus, in a broad sense, interest rates and the ex-
change rate are vulnerable to an adverse shift in
market sentiment.
In a more specific sense, the dollar may be vul-
nerable to an adverse shift in market sentiment
because the U.S. current account deficit has been
increasingly financed by short-term, highly liquid,
capital flows (Chart 5). In the chart, short-term
capital flows are defined as foreign purchases of
U.S. Treasury securities and foreign and domestic
banking flows, which occur in markets that are
highly liquid and have low transactions costs. Long-
term capital flows are defined as direct investments,
which comprise a less liquid market with higher
transactions costs.
15 As the chart shows, net short-
term financing has grown dramatically since 1990,
while net long-term financing has been negative. In
the 1990s, short-term net capital inflows averaged
$64.9 billion and long-term net capital outflows
averaged $10.6 billion. During the 1980s, in con-
trast, net long-term inflows averaged $17.5 billion,
while short-term, liquid, net capital inflows aver-
aged $13.5 billion. Since the financing of the deficit
is now taking place in highly liquid global financial
markets, the risk of higher interest rates and a lower
exchange rate has been heightened.
THE LONG-TERM PROBLEM OF THE
CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT
Large and persistent U.S. current account deficits
also pose a long-term problem for the U.S. econ-
omy. As the United States continues to run a deficit,
U.S. indebtedness to the rest of the world increases,
causing debt service to consume an ever larger
share of income. The degree to which servicing the
debt will burden future generations and lower the
U.S. standard of living depends on whether the net
20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYcapital inflow is used to finance current consump-
tion or productive investment.
A large and persistent current account deficit is
not a problem if the associated net capital inflow is
used to finance productive investment. During the
19th century, for example, net capital inflow into
the United States was large and persistent. Net
capital inflows were about 13 percent of GNP dur-
ing the 1860s, 4 percent during the 1870s, and 11
percent during the 1880s, significantly larger than
those in the 1980s and 1990s.
16 However, these
borrowings from abroad were used to finance the
building of railroads and other productive capacity.
The increased production and income provided by
those investments more than offset the interest pay-
ments on the inflows, boosting U.S. living standards
in the process.
Future living standards could be eroded, though,
if the net capital inflow is used to finance current
consumption. Without the increased future pro-
duction made possible by investment, the United
States will eventually have to consume less than
it produces to meet its future interest obligations.
That is, average living standards will be lower
than they otherwise would be. In effect, by using
capital inflow from abroad for consumption rather
than investment, the United States will be borrow-
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 21consumption. If the current account deficit were
temporary—for example, if capital inflow were
used to finance the recovery from an earthquake—
then borrowing from future consumption to finance
current consumption would make sense. But if the
current account deficit is used to finance persis-
tently higher consumption, then borrowing from
future consumption makes little economic sense.
One way to determine whether future living
standards may be eroded is to see whether invest-
ment increased after 1982 when the United States
began to run a large and persistent current account
deficit. Regardless of the measure used, U.S. invest-
ment has declined since 1982. Gross domestic pri-
vate investment as a share of GDP fell from 16.3
percent in 1960-81 to 15.7 percent in 1982-94, and
net domestic private investment as a share of NDP
fell from 7.9 percent to 5.1 percent over the same
period. In other words, while the United States has
increased its borrowing from abroad, it has reduced
its rate of investment.
17 Consequently, running a
large and persistent current account deficit threat-
ens to reduce future living standards relative to what
they would otherwise be.
CONCLUSIONS
The shift in the U.S. current account from bal-
ance to a large and persistent deficit beginning in
1982 poses both a short-term risk and a long-term
problem for the United States. In the short term, a
shift in market sentiment against U.S. securities
could lead to higher interest rates and a lower
exchange rate in order to attract the foreign capital
needed to finance the current account deficit. In
the long term, a large and persistent current account
deficit threatens future living standards because the
associated borrowing from abroad has not been
used to finance investment spending. Reducing
the  current account deficit would lessen the short-
term risk and help address the long-term problem.
Reducing the current account deficit would lessen
the short-term risk in two ways. First, a smaller
current account deficit would reduce the likelihood
that private investors would lose confidence in U.S.
markets and thus shift to other markets. Second, in
the event that an adverse shift in market sentiment
occurs for some other reason, the effect on interest
rates and exchange rates would be smaller if the
United States were less dependent on an inflow of
foreign capital to finance its smaller current account
deficit. 
Reducing the current account deficit would also
lessen the long-term problem. A smaller current
account deficit would slow the increase in net inter-
national debt, or even reduce the level of debt. As a
result, a smaller debt-servicing burden would be
imposed on future generations.
To be effective in reducing the current account
deficit, economic policy must either reduce invest-
ment, increase private savings, or reduce the budget
deficit. This prescription simply recognizes the fact
that if the domestic uses of funds—investment and
the budget deficit—exceed the domestic source of
funds—private savings—the excess must be bor-
rowed from abroad, resulting in a net capital inflow.
Clearly, reducing investment in order to reduce the
current account deficit is not in the economy’s
long-run interest. Hence, the best prescription to
reduce the U.S. current account deficit is for eco-
nomic policy to encourage domestic savings and to
reduce the budget deficit.
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1 Merchandise trade equals merchandise exports plus
merchandise imports, and total trade equals total exports plus
total imports.
2 According to the Commerce Department (1990, p. 108),
“Foreign official agencies are defined as the treasuries,
including ministries of finance or corresponding departments
of national governments; central banks; stabilization funds,
exchange control offices, or other governmental exchange
authorities’ fiscal agents of national governments that have
as an important part of their functions activities similar to
those of a treasury, central bank, or stabilization fund;
diplomatic and consular establishments; and other agencies
of national governments.” Official foreign reserves held by
the United States are liquid foreign assets held by U.S.
monetary authorities, which includes the U.S. Federal
Reserve and the Department of the Treasury. These liquid
assets include gold, SDRs, balances at the IMF, and foreign
currency in foreign banks. Foreign monetary authorities also
hold these same official reserves. In addition, since the dollar
is an international reserve currency, dollar holdings by
foreign monetary authorities belong to their official reserves.
3 The current account deficit does not equal the measured net
capital inflow because there is a statistical discrepancy. Most
analysts believe the statistical discrepancy represents
unrecorded capital flows. As a result, this article defines the
net capital inflow as the measured net capital inflow plus the
statistical discrepancy. 
4 Rather than looking at gross domestic product and gross
investment, the table examines net saving and net investment,
relative to net domestic product (NDP). 
5 The capital consumption allowance is the difference
between gross investment and net investment, GDP and NDP,
gross private saving and net private saving.
6 Similar results follow if gross figures are used. The net
capital inflow rose from -0.4 percent of GDP to 1.8 percent;
gross private domestic investment fell from 16.5 percent of
GDP to 15.7 percent; gross private saving fell from 17.5
percent of GDP to 17.0 percent; and the government’s budget
deficit rose from 0.6 percent of GDP to 2.9 percent.
7 All figures in this article use the median as the measure of
the average. The median is preferable to the simple arithmetic
average when there are large outliers. The 87 percent is
calculated as the median value of the net private capital inflow
divided by the median value of the current account deficit. As
an alternative, one could calculate the median value of the net
private capital inflow divided by the current account deficit.
This calculation says that net private inflows financed 72
percent of the deficit. Either way, net private capital inflows
financed a significant part of the current account deficit.
8 The IMF projects a current account deficit of about 2.4
percent of GDP through the end of this century. Ignoring
valuation changes and a difference between interest rates and
growth rates, this means that net international debt rises by
2.4 percentage points each year. While this is a crude
approximation, it generates reasonable estimates.
9 The most recent data available are for 1992. The results are
derived from figures provided by OECD, 1994, p. A.54. To
distinguish net assets from net debt, debt is shown as a
negative number and assets, a positive number. 
10 Economic theory does say, however, that only new
information or financial turmoil could convince investors that
the current or projected level of net international debt is
too high. In an efficient financial market, only new
information—news about the future path of the current account
deficit, the economic outlook, macro policy, trade policy, or
a financial shock of some kind—should cause investors to
reevaluate their views of investing in the United States.
11 The totals do not add to 100 percent for two reasons. First,
changes in U.S. government assets are part of the current
account but are not included as private capital flows or official
capital flows. Changes in U.S. government assets are
typically a capital outflow rather than a capital inflow. A
capital outflow means that the U.S. government is making
loans to foreign governments. For example, during 1982-91,
private net capital inflows averaged $97,316 million, official
net capital inflows averaged $13,807.5 million, and the
change in U.S. government assets averaged -$508 million (a
capital outflow of $508 million). Since the change in U.S.
government assets was negative, private capital inflows
plus official net capital inflows were greater than the total
net capital inflow. As a result, private net capital inflows
and official net capital inflows more than financed the
current account deficit. Second, since the average is
calculated as the median, there is no guarantee that the
averages must sum to 100 percent. That is, during 1982-91,
the sum of the average private, official, and government
net capital inflows was $110,616 million, yet the average
current account deficit was $101,292 million.
12 Monetary authorities hold dollar reserves for three basic
reasons: to intervene in foreign exchange markets, to offset
international shocks, and to facilitate trade. When the
Bundesbank intervenes to support the dollar, it sells deutsche
marks to buy dollars, and then adds the dollars to its portfolio.
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In addition, holding foreign exchange reserves—primarily
dollars—can reduce the duration and severity of balance of
payments adjustment problems caused by international
shocks. This precautionary motive for holding dollar reserves
may be especially important for developing countries. When
possible, many developing countries choose to increase their
holdings of dollar assets, thus leading to an official net capital
inflow for the United States. Finally, many transactions
between foreigners use dollars. For example, throughout the
world, oil is bought and sold using dollars. Therefore, to
facilitate trade, foreign central banks often hold dollar
reserves as part of their portfolio.
13 See Survey of Current Business (1993, p. 46) for a
discussion of official flows in 1992. According to the
Survey of Current Business (1994, p. 67), “Some Latin
American countries may have invested unused proceeds from
international debt issues in the United States.” Chairman
Greenspan, in his “Monetary Policy Report to the Congress,”
February 22, 1994, stated: “In addition, various developing
countries, particularly in Latin America, experienced large
private capital flows into their countries and added substantially
to their official holdings in the United States” (p. 210).
Chairman Greenspan, in his “Monetary Policy Report to the
Congress,” February 21, 1995, stated: “Increases in foreign
official assets were substantial in 1994 but were somewhat
smaller than in 1993. In particular, the large reserve
accumulations in 1994 by certain developing countries in
Latin America experiencing massive private capital inflows
were not repeated in 1994" (p. 230).
14 Furthermore, when transactions costs in spot markets are
too high, investors can often replicate the transaction using
derivative markets, which have low transactions costs.
15 The definition of liquid capital flows is probably an
understatement. It excludes securities transactions.
Securities transactions include securities with maturities
greater than one year. While not short term, these securities
are often liquid.
16 These figures are very approximate. Two sources were
used. Calculating the net capital inflow as a share of GNP
required several assumptions. Hughes (p. 412) reports net
U.S. capital movements by decades. His figures show that the
average net inflow was $876 million (1861-70), $332 million
(1871-80), and $1,310 million (1881-90). The Historical
Statistics of the United States (Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, p. 231) report U.S. GNP by a different
set of subperiods. They report GNP equals $6,710 million
(1869-73), $7,530 million (1872-76), $9,180 million
(1877-81), $11,300 million (1882-86), and $12,300 million
(1887-91). To make them comparable, average GNP for the
1860s was estimated to be $6,710 million; average GNP for
the 1870s was estimated as the average for the 1872-81
period, and average GNP for the 1880s was estimated as the
average for the 1882-91 period.
17 The conclusion that investment fell is controversial
because there was an unprecedented change in the
composition of investment beginning in the mid-1970s. Faust
(p. 15) argues that “there was no investment boom in the
1980s—nor was there a great bust.” Even if investment were
unchanged, the need to service the debt may still impose a
burden on future generations.
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